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Internet (Re)Search by Judges, Jurors, and Lawyers
H. ALBERT LIOU & JASPER L. TRAN*
ABSTRACT
How can Internet research be used properly and reliably in law? This paper
analyzes several key and very different issues affecting judges, jurors, and lawyers.
With respect to judges, this paper discusses the rules of judicial conduct and how
they guide the appropriate use of the Internet for research; the standards for judicial
notice; and whether judges can consider a third category of non-adversarially
presented, non-judicially noticed factual evidence. With respect to jurors, this paper
discusses causes of and deterrents to jurors conducting Internet research during
trials; and the recourse available to parties who are adversely impacted by such
behavior. With respect to lawyers, this paper discusses reliance on and potential
pitfalls of using free Internet resources to conduct legal research; the dangers of
rotten Internet links; and evidentiary considerations in citing to Internet evidence.
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“Don’t believe everything you read on the Internet.”1
The Internet, the world’s most accessible research tool, provides the public with a sea of
information that is increasing every day.2 But along with its conveniences, it also introduces new
and sometimes unwanted influences on the American system of litigation.3 This paper analyzes
frequently encountered issues relating to the conduct of research on the Internet.
Legal research once required physically making a trip to the law library and perusing
reporters and hardbound treatises. Similarly, factual research involved reviewing entries in
encyclopedias, news articles, and other physical publications. These activities have been rendered
archaic with the proliferation of the Internet in the past three decades,4 which now conveniently
allows for legal and factual research to be performed in the comfort of a person’s own office or
home, or even in transit.5
But advances in technology do not exist in a vacuum; they raise new challenges as well.6
As the amount of information published on the Internet has increased, has its reliability and

1

Remarks by President Obama at YSEALI Town Hall (May 25, 2016), available at 2016 WL 2997085, at *14;
William D. Toronto, Fake News and Kill-Switches: The U.S. Government’s Fight to Respond to and Prevent Fake
News, 79 A.F. L. REV. 167, 169, 169 n.2 (2018) (sarcastically quoting President Abraham Lincoln). The running joke,
especially in light of the proliferation of “fake news,” is that people nowadays believe everything they read on the
Internet.
2
E.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (recognizing the Internet as “an international
network of interconnected computers that enables millions of people to communicate with one another in ‘cyberspace’
and to access vast amounts of information from around the world.”); Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Gore,
Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265,
269, 269 n.22 (2002) (crediting Al Gore for coining the term “information superhighway” in the early 1990s to
introduce the Internet to the public); Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village, 265 SCI. AM. 150, 150–53 (1991)
(viewing the Internet as a technology “that enhance[s] the ability to create and understand information”); see also
Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 643 (2014) (“Internet innovations . . . rely
fundamentally on empowering individuals to share with each other.”). Nevertheless, people were skeptical of the
Internet in its early days. For instance, Judge Easterbrook initially viewed cyberlaw (Internet law) as “law of the
horse.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 207, 207–08, 211, 214
(“Most behavior in cyberspace is easy to classify under current property principles. . . . [L]et the world of cyberspace
evolve as it will.”). But see Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501(1999) (defending cyberlaw in response to Judge Easterbrook).
3
See, e.g., Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Balancing the Scales: The Ford-Firestone Case, the Internet, and the Future
Dispute Resolution Landscape, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2004) (“[V]irtual courts are the clearest manifestation of
the Internet’s influence on dispute resolution, but its influence extends beyond the immediate online environment.”).
4
See, e.g., Janet Abbate, Privatizing the Internet: Competing Visions and Chaotic Events, 1987–1995, 32 IEEE
ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 10, 11, 15 (2010) (citing The High Performance Computing Act of 1991, codified at 15
U.S.C. § 5501 et seq.) (discussing the Internet’s history, including how its infrastructure was financed by the High
Performance Computing Act of 1991).
5
See also Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 473 (2015) (discussing what “the
computer industry did in 1976—a set of large, expensive machines used by businesses and a fringe of cheap,
homemade computers used primarily by hobbyists. But computers rapidly joined the mainstream in the 1980s as
processing power increased and size and cost decreased, making a personal computer a plausible investment.”).
6
See Gore, supra note 2 at 150–53 (analyzing “changes in the traditional legal concepts of property, ownership,
originality, privacy, and intellectual freedom” in light of the arrival of the Internet). But see Brad A. Greenberg,
Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2016) (“Skeptics . . . argued that the Internet is
merely a focal point for the study of numerous already established areas of law (e.g., tort, contract, criminal
procedure).”).
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accuracy decreased?7 Can too much access to information have negative consequences in the law?
A federal judge once stated:
While some look to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication, the
Court continues to warily and wearily view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor,
innuendo, and misinformation. So as to not mince words, the Court reiterates that
this so-called Web provides no way of verifying the authenticity of the alleged
contentions that Plaintiff wishes to rely upon in his [brief]. There is no way Plaintiff
can overcome the presumption that the information he discovered on the Internet is
inherently untrustworthy. Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No web-site is
monitored for accuracy and nothing contained therein is under oath or even subject
to independent verification absent underlying documentation. Moreover, the Court
holds no illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any
location at any time. For these reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is
adequate for almost nothing, even under the most liberal interpretation of the
hearsay exception rules found in FED. R. EVID. 807.8
Twenty years have passed since that “famous skepticism.”9 The Internet is no longer viewed as an
unknown frontier to be conquered, but is now relied upon as a staple resource necessary for
everyday living.10 Many judges and attorneys routinely consult, rely on, and cite to Internet sources
in their professions.11 Jurors will typically have unfettered access to the Internet before and after
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 304 (2014) (recognizing the “reliance on potentially inaccurate
sources of criminal history information made possible by technological advances . . . [w]here criminal records are
increasingly available on the Internet.”); Sofia Grafanaki, Drowning in Big Data: Abundance of Choice, Scarcity of
Attention and the Personalization Trap, a Case for Regulation, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1, 1 n.5 (2017) (“Today’s
Internet is Optimized for Noise.” (citation omitted)).
8
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 n.30 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting “the famous skepticism expressed
in St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999)” (citing FED. R. EVID. 807));
see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Pollari, 228 So. 3d 115, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“The internet . . . lack[s]
effective formal mechanisms of authentication. Despite advances in technology and the ability to fact-check more
readily, separating fact from fiction nonetheless remains a daunting task for the average consumer of internet
information. With that comes the inherent risk that inaccurate information can appear legitimate, and may
inadvertently be perpetuated despite the best of intentions. Understanding that reality, holding a purveyor of web
content accountable for providing its viewers access to a broad range of information would open a ‘Pandora’s Box’
where they could be legally bound by almost any statement or content found on a linked webpage or document—
including unfiltered visitor comments, third-party advertising, or additional links to other sources—all without regard
to whether that content is disputed, controversial, or conflicting. This would serve no purpose other than to chill the
dissemination of information by deterring website owners or operators from incorporating any third-party content for
fear of tying themselves to the yoke of those sources.”); Nordstrom, Inc. v. NoMoreRack Retail Grp., Inc., No. 12-cv1853, 2013 WL 1196948, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2013) (“The majority of complaints are from anonymous
Internet users that have posted on various blogs and forums online . . . designed to facilitate negative feedback from
disgruntled customers or even competitors, who can write multiple reviews across multiple forums. The evidence is
not persuasive.”); In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“Information from
the internet does not necessarily bear an indicia of reliability and therefore must be properly authenticated by
affidavit.”); Trademark Properties, Inc. v. A & E Television Networks, No. 06-cv-2195, 2008 WL 4811461, at *2 n.2
(D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2008) (“The accuracy and reliability of information from the Internet is highly questionable.”).
9
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 555.
10
See also discussion, supra note 5.
11
See, e.g., Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: Appellate Courts’ Use of Internet
Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417, 418, 418 n.3 (2002) (collecting “the opinions written by Supreme Court
7
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trial, and they sometimes even have access during trial. For most people, the Internet is the first
place they turn to when they have a question about anything.12
How can Internet research be used properly and reliably in law? While this ethical issue is
not new, its scholarship is rather dispersed and lacks one go-to reference for quick consultation.
Legal scholars have previously examined individual topics on judges’ independent Internet
research,13 jurors’ Internet use during trial,14 or lawyers’ Internet search of potential jurors during
jury selection for voir dire.15 This paper contributes to the existing literature by serving as a single,
consolidated study of numerous legal and practical issues encountered by lawyers, judges, and
jurors with respect to Internet research in chambers, in the courtroom, or in the office. Moreover,
recent guidance issued by the American Bar Association in Formal Opinion 478 on “Independent
Factual Research by Judges via the Internet,”16 has memorialized prior thinking and attempts to
bring consistency to judges’ conduct. This paper further contributes to the legal literature by
analyzing ABA Opinion 478 (including the cases that have cited to ABA Opinion 478 with
approval) and other recent developments from this broad area of law in depth.
This paper consists of three parts. With respect to judges, Part I discusses the rules of
judicial conduct and how they guide the appropriate use of the Internet for research; the standards
for judicial notice; and whether judges can consider a third category of non-adversarially
presented, non-judicially noticed factual evidence. With respect to jurors, Part II discusses causes
justices and federal circuit judges that cite sources found on the Internet[:] There are at least 361 distinct citations to
web sites by federal appellate courts in their opinions from 1996 to 2001”).
12
See discussion, supra note 1; see also Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV.
1255, 1260–61 (2012) (discussing how “[s]ocial science studies, raw statistics, and other data are all just a Google
search away” from the Justices and their law clerks and that such legislative facts are often cited in Court opinions or
raised at oral argument).
13
See, e.g., Carolyn A. Dubay, Public Confidence in the Courts in the Internet Age: The Ethical Landscape for Judges
in the Post-Watergate Era, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 531, 558–63 (2018) (“The use of social media in particular, is
extremely useful because of the ‘unprecedented need for judges to respond with educational efforts that will ameliorate
the public’s misconceptions about the justice system and strengthen its commitment to an independent judiciary.’”
(quoting CYNTHIA GRAY, STATE JUSTICE INST., WHEN JUDGES SPEAK UP 1 (1998))); Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome
A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1215–16 (1975) (“[Justices] conduct . . . independent research; they send their law
clerks scurrying through the libraries and elsewhere . . . to add to the totality of knowledge about the social issues that
they must decide as lawyers.”).
14
See, e.g., Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Preventing Juror Misconduct in a Digital World, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981
(2015); Robbie Manhas, Responding to Independent Juror Research in the Internet Age: Positive Rules, Negative
Rules, and Outside Mechanisms, 112 MICH. L. REV. 809 (2014); Patrick M. Delaney, Sorry Linus, I Need Your Security
Blanket: How the Smartphone, Constant Connectivity with the Internet, and Social Networks Act as Catalysts for
Juror Misconduct, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 473 (2012).
15
See, e.g., Michael Begovich, Voir Dire in a Digital World: A Model for Ethical Internet Investigation of the Venire,
36 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 227 (2014); Eric P. Robinson, Virtual Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of Investigating Jurors
Online, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 597 (2013).
16
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 478 (2017) [hereinafter “ABA Opinion 478”]. Worth noting is
the term “opinion” of the American Bar Association, which is simply advisory, not binding, on lawyers and judges
because the ABA and its Committee on Professional Discipline, by their own admission, “have no regulatory authority
over lawyers and judges.” See Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://web.archive.org/web/20141223171846/https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/com
mittees_commissions/disciplinecommittee.html (captured on Dec. 23, 2014). Notwithstanding, at least three cases
have cited ABA Opinion 478 with approval: Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d
213, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Tri-State Zoological Park of W. Maryland,
Inc., No. MJG-17-2148, 2018 WL 1083641, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2018); and Commonwealth v. Hilaire, 95 N.E.3d
278, 283 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
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of and deterrents to jurors conducting Internet research during trials; and the recourse available to
parties who are adversely impacted by jurors conducting Internet research during trial. With
respect to lawyers, Part III discusses reliance on and potential pitfalls of using free Internet
resources to conduct legal research; the dangers of reliance on Internet links; and evidentiary
considerations in citing to Internet evidence. The authors’ conclusions follow.17

I.

INTERNET RESEARCH BY JUDGES

Judges have always been free to conduct independent legal research beyond the parties’
submissions. “It is no revelation that courts look to cases, statutes, regulations, treatises, scholarly
articles, legislative history, treaties and other legal materials in figuring out what the law is and
resolving legal issues.” 18 The conduct of factual research by judges, however, raises ethical
questions involving the fairness of a court’s decision making, potential bias, and judicial advocacy.
Both the Judicial Conference’s Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges and the
American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct prescribe that a judge should
perform the duties of her office impartially and diligently. 19 The burden is on the parties to a
litigation, and not the judge (or her clerk), to put forth evidence supporting their respective cases
and create a factual record sufficient for the judge to decide the case.20 The judge’s job is to judge,
not to do the parties’ jobs for them.21 Else, the judge runs the risk of bias in favor of one side over
the other, or giving the appearance of such.
a. ABA Opinion on Internet Research by Judges
U.S. circuit judges, district judges, and magistrate judges must abide by the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges.22 Unlike Rule 2.9(C) of the ABA Model Code, however, the
17

This paper primarily focuses on how federal law has interpreted these issues.
de Fontbrune v. Wofsy, 838 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2016).
19
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3
(Judicial
Conference
2019),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges
[perma.cc/W3HC-BA6K].
20
See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9(C) (“A judge shall not investigate facts in a manner independently, and
shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.”).
21
Stephen Ellmann, Truth and Consequences, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 918 (2000) (quoting ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM, 1 TRIAL MANUAL 4 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 80 (1984)); see also United States v.
Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in
briefs.”); Nw. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Baltes, 15 F.3d 660, 662–63 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[J]udges are not archaeologists. They
need not excavate masses of papers in search of revealing tidbits-not only because the rules of procedure place the
burden on the litigants, but also because their time is scarce.”).
22
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES intro. (stating that judges have “a duty to follow the law”). Samuel L. Bray,
Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 451 (2017) (citing PHILIP
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008)); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Natural Law Influences on the First
Generation of American Constitutional Law: Reflections on Philip Hamburger’s Law and Judicial Duty, 6 J. L., PHIL.
& CULTURE 103, 122 n.71 (2011) (explaining that the holding in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), was “further
evidence of how judges could do their duty”). Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1981) (showing
that same goes for a sworn jury after the judge “instruct[s] the jury that it was their duty to follow the law as it was
stated by him”); accord United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014); E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const.
Co., 731 F.3d 444, 459 n.14 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Holmes, 409 F. App’x 545, 554 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010);
Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bruce, 109 F.3d 323, 327 (7th
Cir. 1997) (citing Seventh Circuit Pattern Instruction No. 1.01).
18
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Code of Conduct for United States Judges, does not include any provisions directed specifically to
the propriety of factual research by judges.23 When the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
was first created in 1973, it essentially adopted the ABA model at the time, although the two codes
have diverged since.24 Nevertheless, the ABA Model Code remains influential on federal judges,
and it has been adopted in 36 states.25
On December 8, 2017, the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
of the American Bar Association released Formal Opinion 478 on “Independent Factual Research
by Judges via the Internet,” which set forth guidance on what constitutes proper and improper
Internet factual research by judges.26 The opinion cited heavily to the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. The opinion made clear that “[j]udges risk violating the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
by searching the Internet for information related to participants or facts in a proceeding.”27
The opinion analyzed the provisions of the ABA Model Code with respect to Internet
research.28 First, it noted that the ban on ex parte communication under Model Rule 2.9(A) ensures
that judges review and rule based only on the facts and evidence presented in the case. 29 Next, it
emphasized that Model Rule 2.9(C) precludes judges from engaging in independent factual
research, although judges are permitted to conduct legal research beyond the cases and authorities
cited by the parties.30 Model Rule 2.9(C) permits judges to consider only the evidence presented
to them or facts “that may properly be judicially noticed.”31 As noted in the opinion, Federal Rule
of Evidence 201(a) allows judicial notice of adjudicative facts (i.e., factual issues), not legislative
facts.32 It explained that:
23

Compare MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9(C), with CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES.
Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28
JUST. SYS. J. 3, 271 (2007).
25
See Jurisdictional Adoption of Revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N (October 17, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_regulation/map/
[perma.cc/F53F-PSZV].
26
See discussion in supra note 16.
27
ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 1, 1 n.1 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, “there are two opposing canons
on almost every point.” Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950); see also Bray, supra note 22, at 445
(“[T]here is always a principle on each side”). But see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
3, 26–27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (responding to Llewellyn that “there really are not two opposite canons on ‘almost
every point’—unless one enshrines as a canon whatever vapid statement has ever been made by a willful, law-bending
judge. . . . Every canon is simply one indication of meaning; and if there are more contrary indications (perhaps
supported by other canons) it must yield. But that does not render the entire enterprise a fraud —not, at least, unless
the judge wishes to make it so.” (emphasis in original)).
28
ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 2–5.
29
Id. at 2–3 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9(A)).
30
ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 3–4 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9(C)); see also Hilaire, 95
N.E.3d at 284 n.7 (citing ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16) (stressing that “judges should use great caution before
conducting independent research into factual matters, particularly on the [I]nternet.”).
31
ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 3–4 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9(C)).
32
ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 4 (citing FED. R. EVID. 201(a)). See also Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial
Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 39–40 (2011) (describing “adjudicative facts” as
those specific and relevant to the parties and the issues to be decided, whereas legislative facts deal with general
information, such as important background information, legislative history, or generalized data and studies); Elizabeth
G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 149–53
(2008) (describing the history of and meaning of adjudicative versus legislative facts). But see RICHARD A. POSNER,
REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 136–37 (2013) (describing four categories of “facts” in litigation: adjudicative facts,
legislative facts, incontestable facts that can be judicially noticed, and background facts).
24
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[A]djudicative facts are those to which the law is applied in the process of
adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to the jury in a jury case. They
relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses. “Legislative
facts,” on the other hand, “do not usually concern the immediate parties but are
general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and
discretion.”33
Finally, Model Rule 2.9(D) imposes upon a judges a duty to supervise and requires that judges
take steps to prevent court staff and officials from performing improper independent investigations
into facts.34
ABA Opinion 478 also provided the following guidelines for judges to follow when
deciding whether independent judicial factual research via the Internet is appropriate:
1. Is additional information necessary to decide the case? If so, this type of
information generally must be provided by counsel or the parties, or must be subject
to proper judicial notice.
2. Is the purpose of the judge’s inquiry to corroborate facts, discredit facts, or fill a
factual gap in the record? If the facts are adjudicative, it is improper for a judge to
do so.
3. Is the judge seeking general or educational information that is useful to provide the
judge with a better understanding of a subject unrelated to a pending or impending
case? If so, the inquiry is appropriate. Judges may use the Internet as they would
other educational sources, like judicial seminars and books.
4. Is the judge seeking background information about a party or about the subject
matter of a pending or impending case? If so, the information may represent
adjudicative facts or legislative facts, depending on the circumstances. The key
inquiry here is whether the information to be gathered is of factual consequence in
determining the case. If it is, it must be subject to testing through the adversary
process.35
The opinion analyzes several hypotheticals. Some key takeaways from the hypotheticals are
identified below:
First, judges may educate themselves about general topics of interest, even on topics that
may come before the judge.36 This is akin to attending judicial seminars or reading books, so long
33

ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 5 (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 353
§ 15.03 (West 1958) and Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 245 & n.52 (5th Cir. 1976)).
34
ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 5 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9(D)).
35
ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 6; see also People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Tri-State
Zoological Park of W. Maryland, Inc., No. MJG-17-2148, 2018 WL 1083641, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2018) (citing
ABA Opinion 478, supra note 16, at 6) (“There is no prohibition against a federal judge’s access to the Internet to
obtain background information regarding the subject of a case before the Court.”).
36
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing ABA
Opinion 478, see supra note 16 (“In deciding jurisdictional, standing and other issues fundamental to the present
litigation, the court has engaged in extensive background research, but not on the specific frauds charged. This is

8

IP THEORY

[Vol. 9:1

as there is reason to believe the source is reliable. For example, in a judicial district where many
environmental contamination cases are filed, a judge in that district may read online background
information about environmental law before a case is assigned to that judge. 37 Judges cannot
independently research information, or even conduct general subject-area searches, during a
pending case to make an adjudicative decision of material fact.
Second, judges may not research factual issues that normally go to the jury or involve
weighing the parties’ respective expert testimony. For example, if a party asserts in a case
involving overtime pay that the restaurant at issue does not open during weekends, checking
websites like Yelp and Google for the restaurant’s business hours would violate Model Rule 2.9(C)
because such information is key to decide whether that party could prevail on the claim of unpaid
overtime. 38 Similarly, where a judge has heard testimony from competing experts about their
investigations and opinions as to the cause of a fire that destroyed a plaintiff’s property in an
insurance coverage dispute, a judge abiding by Model Rule 2.9(C) may not conduct independent
reading on techniques for investigating fires of unknown origin.39
Third, a judge conducting online research to gather information about a juror or party in a
pending or impending case would violate Model Rule 2.9(C).40 For example, a judge may not
review the social media and websites of each party in a pending case to learn background
information about the parties. On the other hand, judges are not as restricted from researching
attorneys appearing before the court. For example, a judge may gather information about an outof-state lawyer simply to become familiar with counsel who appear before the court via a legal
directory like Martindale Hubbell. Such information gathering about a lawyer becomes
impermissible, however, if it would affect the judge’s weighing or considering of adjudicative
facts.41
b. Judicial Notice: What Lawyers Should Know
Courts may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because
they are generally known or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

appropriate. . . . It is appropriate and necessary for the judge to do research required by a case in order to understand
the context and background of the issues involved so long as the judge indicates to the parties the research and
conclusions, by opinions and otherwise, so they may contest and clarify. It would be a misapprehension of the ABA
rule to conclude otherwise.”) (internal citation omitted)). “Context always matters. Let us not forget, however, why
context matters: It is a tool for understanding the terms of the law.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 135 n.45 (1927) (“In actual fact, whenever it comes to defining a legal concept, or stating a legal rule,
the difficulty of treating them as clean-cut independent entities at once becomes apparent. Almost every legal concept
or principle is found to be but the terminal of a scale which shades at its opposite extremity into another of exactly
contrary tendency, and the line between the two oscillates from specific case to case according to the context.”); cf.
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (Holmes, J.) (“Law is a statement of the
circumstances.”).
37
ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 7 (Hypothetical #2).
38
See id. at 6–7 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9(C)) (Hypothetical #1).
39
See ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 8–9 (Hypothetical #4).
40
See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 at 2 (2013) (citing MODEL CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT r. 2.9(C)) (“[A] judge must . . . avoid using any [electronic social media] site to obtain information regarding
a matter before the judge.”).
41
See ABA Opinion 478, see supra note 16, at 7–8 (Hypothetical #3).
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accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.42 Courts may take judicial notice on their own, or must
take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.43
Upon request, however, any party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of the taking of the
judicial notice.44 “[I]t is not uncommon for courts to take judicial notice of factual information
found on Internet websites.” 45 Prior examples of judicially noticed facts, as recognized by
appellate courts, include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders;
an online PDF of the Massachusetts Commercial Automobile Insurance Manual;
historical retirement fund earnings of a corporation as shown on its website;
a term defined on the website of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.;
a definition of “Adjustment Disorder” in the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; and
Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC’s Bushmaster Operating and Safety
Instruction Manual for All Bushmaster XM15 and C15 Models that is publicly
available on Bushmaster’s official website.46

On the other hand, judges have refused to take judicial notice of “facts” taken from the
Internet due to inaccuracy or the inability to confirm the accuracy. For example, a court refused to
take judicial notice of a printout from a website that was captured in November 2015 where “the
relevant time period for the claims [wa]s from roughly July 2014 through May 2015.”47 Courts
regularly deny requests to take judicial notice of information from Wikipedia.48 Many courts have
acknowledged the inherent unreliability of Wikipedia, with one court summarizing the flaws as
follows:
A review of the Wikipedia website reveals a pervasive and, for our purposes,
disturbing series of disclaimers, among them, that: (i) any given Wikipedia article
may be, at any given moment, in a bad state: for example it could be in the middle
of a large edit or it could have been recently vandalized; (ii) Wikipedia articles are
also subject to remarkable oversights and omissions; (iii) Wikipedia articles (or
series of related articles) are liable to be incomplete in ways that would be less usual
in a more tightly controlled reference work; (iv) “[a]nother problem with a lot of
content on Wikipedia is that many contributors do not cite their sources, something
42

FED. R. EVID. 201(b); see, e.g., Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World All., 314 F. Supp. 3d 420, 442 (E.D.N.Y.
2018) (“In the instant case, where the relationship between commerce and religion is observable through judicial
notice, explicit congressional findings are unneeded.”).
43
FED. R. EVID. 201(c); see also Commonwealth v. Hilaire, 95 N.E.3d 278, 283 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018) (“Even in
situations where judicial notice is appropriate, it should not be taken without notice to the parties and an opportunity
to be heard.”).
44
FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
45
Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, No. 2010-1327, 2010 WL 3591783, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 10, 2010) (citing
O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007)).
46
United States v. Flores, No. 16-40622, 2018 WL 1864956, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 18, 2018) (collecting cases).
47
Hsu v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1283 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
48
See Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases).
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that makes it hard for the reader to judge the credibility of what is written; and (v)
“many articles commence their lives as partisan drafts” and may be caught up in a
heavily unbalanced viewpoint.49
A court may refuse to take judicial notice of information on a webpage that has been taken
down.50 At the same time, some courts are willing to take judicial notice of archived webpages
from the Internet Archive.51 For example, in Dzinesquare, Inc. v. Armano Luxury Alloys, Inc., the
patentee, Dzinesquare, Inc. (d/b/a “2 Crave”), asserted a design patent covering a patented design
for aftermarket wheels.52 The defendant moved for summary judgment that 2 Crave’s patent was
invalid and requested that the court take judicial notice of information submitted from various
websites, including archived webpages from the Internet Archive, showing 2 Crave’s own wheels
to be offered for sale and in public use. 53 The defendant submitted an affidavit of the office
manager of the Internet Archive to attest to the date of the submitted webpages and the Internet
Archive’s procedures for archiving webpages. 54 The court took judicial notice of the various
webpage exhibits and relied on those exhibits to grant summary judgment due to 2 Crave’s
products being on sale and in public use before the critical date of the patent.55
While a court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding,56 the ability of a court
to do so can be particularly useful to lawyers filing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, where the case is decided on the pleadings.57 Judicial notice can thus help a
movant meet its burden of proof at a stage of the case where substantive discovery has not yet been
taken. But “[b]ecause the effect of judicial notice is to deprive a party of the opportunity to use
rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument to attack contrary evidence, caution must be
used in determining that a fact is beyond controversy under Rule 201(b).”58
Finally, lawyers can appeal a judge’s decision on judicial notice. A district court’s decision
to take, or refusal to take, judicial notice is reviewed for abuse of discretion.59 In American Prairie
Construction Co. v. Hoich, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court erred by taking judicial
notice of certain business records of one defendant and a book written by another defendant, and
relying on those facts to find that the defendants were bound to a $2.5 million settlement

Id. at 1028–29 (citing Campbell ex rel. Campbell v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 69 Fed. Cl. 775, 781 (2006)).
See, e.g., Keithly v. Intelius Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 2011) ( “The Court’s inability to confirm
the accuracy of the facts presented in these [screen shots] suggests that judicial notice is not appropriate.”).
51
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-1898 MDL No. 1358 (SAS), 2013 WL
6869410, at *4 n.65 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2013) (collecting cases), vacated in part, For an example, see the link cited
in supra note 16.
52
No. 14-cv-01918, 2014 WL 12597154, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2014).
53
Id. at *3.
54
Id. at *3 n.4.
55
Id. at *3, *6.
56
FED. R. EVID. 201(d).
57
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (“[C]ourts must consider the complaint
in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in
particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.”).
58
Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing FED. R.
EVID. 201(b)).
59
See Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.9 (9th Cir. 2012); Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp.,
162 F.3d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. McCoy, No. 89-cv-5659, 1990 WL 190498, at *13 (4th Cir. Dec
4, 1990).
49
50
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agreement.60 The district court had obtained defendant Tri-State Financial, LLC’s (TSF) business
records by asking TSF for them during trial.61 The district court had also located defendant Hoich’s
book by conducting independent Internet research. 62 The Eighth Circuit concluded the district
court had abused its discretion in the following ways:
•

•

•
•

The court took judicial notice of statements Hoich made in his book about his
success and friendships, despite these “facts” not being of the kind that are either
generally known or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b);
The court failed to give defendant Hoich advance notice that the court intended to
take judicial notice of certain TSF business records and of Hoich’s book, such that
Hoich could object and have an opportunity to be heard, as permitted under Federal
Rule of Evidence 201(e);
The court took judicial notice of the TSF business records despite them containing
hearsay evidence without any foundation that would make them admissible at trial;
and
The court went outside the record by conducting independent Internet research.63

Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment as to Hoich.64
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, an appellate court “will affirm such
decisions unless they are arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.”65 For example, the “district court by
definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”66 Given that whether to take judicial
notice is determined based upon a clear application of the law, an erroneous or improper taking of
judicial notice could result in a straightforward appeal. As to evidence of proof, if a judicial opinion
cited to a source that was not mentioned by either side’s counsel, that citation should be analyzed
as to its permissibility under the relevant judicial notice rule.
c. Independent Factual Research to Confirm a Genuine Issue of
Fact: A Third Category of Evidence?
Unless judicial notice of facts is taken in accordance with the substantive and procedural
requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the factual record in a case is built from the
presentation of facts by the parties in an adversarial manner.67 Such facts can be then challenged
by the opposing party through “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof.”68 Are courts permitted to consider facts presented
in any other way?

60

560 F.3d 780, 798 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 796.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 797–98 (citing FED. R. EVID. 201).
64
Hoich, 560 F.3d at 798.
65
In re Deepwater Horizon, 824 F.3d 571, 580–81 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
66
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).
67
See FED. R. EVID. 201.
68
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
61
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The Seventh Circuit seemed to imply so in Rowe v. Gibson.69 In Rowe, prison inmate Rowe
filed a civil rights complaint against prison administrators, alleging that they had been deliberately
indifferent to his digestive pain by giving him Zantac medication only at 9:30 am and 9:30 pm,
instead of near his prescribed mealtimes. 70 The defendants moved for summary judgment,
submitting an affidavit from the prison doctor (who was also a defendant in the lawsuit) that stated
“it does not matter what time of day Mr. Rowe receives his Zantac prescription. Each Zantac pill
is fully effective for twelve-hour increments. Zantac does not have to be taken before or with a
meal to be effective.”71 Rowe did not move to exclude the prison doctor as an expert witness.72
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.73
The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that Rowe’s allegations were sufficient to preclude
summary judgment,74 but in doing so, the court cited to Zantac’s website, the Mayo Clinic website,
and various other health websites that advised users of the importance and benefits of taking Zantac
thirty to sixty minutes before a meal.75 The Seventh Circuit majority admitted that the accuracy of
the facts from these websites was not indisputable, and thus could not be judicially noticed.76
Nonetheless, the court noted:
When medical information can be gleaned from the websites of highly reputable
medical centers, it is not imperative that it instead be presented by a testifying
witness. Such information tends to fall somewhere between facts that require
adversary procedure to determine and facts of which a court can take judicial notice,
but it is closer to the second in a case like this in which the evidence presented by
the defendants in the district court was sparse and the appellate court need only
determine whether there is a factual dispute sufficient to preclude summary
judgment.77
Over a strong dissent, the court reversed summary judgment, basing its decision on “Rowe’s
declarations, the timeline of his inability to obtain Zantac, the manifold contradictions in Dr.
Wolfe’s affidavits, and, last, the cautious, limited Internet research that [it had] conducted in
default of the parties’ having done so.”78 In holding as it did, the Seventh Circuit majority appeared
to recognize a category of evidence neither presented via an adversarial method nor taken by
judicial notice, but instead as “non-adversarial evidence that the court believes is probably
correct.”79
While the majority justified its use of Internet research by stating that the information was
used merely to confirm that a genuine issue of fact existed, the dissent pointed out several
complicated questions. Does this mean the district judge should have also performed the
69

798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.).
Id. at 623–27.
71
Id. at 625.
72
Id. at 630.
73
Id. at 623.
74
Id. at 631.
75
Id. at 625–26. When discussing the possible credibility of information found on corporate websites, Judge Richard
Posner noted that “[i]t might be thought that a corporate website . . . would be a suspect source of information. Not
so; the manufacturer would be taking grave risks if it misrepresented the properties of its product.” Id. at 626.
76
Id. at 629.
77
Id. at 628–29.
78
Id. at 630.
79
Id. at 630 (Hamilton, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
70
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independent factual research? What are the standards that apply? How can parties plan for judges
conducting independent factual research? And finally, how reliable is the research? 80 These
questions remain, and it is left to be seen how many other courts, if any, will follow in the footsteps
of the Seventh Circuit in endorsing engagement of this type of factual research by judges.
II.

INTERNET RESEARCH BY JURORS

A touchstone of the U.S. judicial system is a fair trial by an impartial trier of fact—“a jury
capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”81 During the course of a
trial, jurors are susceptible to influence from a number of sources not constituting evidence, such
as comments from attorneys or the judge, conversations with family members or friends, reports
from television or newspapers, and, in the past couple of decades, information disseminated on the
Internet. The convenience of modern-day smartphones and easy access to the Internet has made
Internet research particularly tempting for jurors. Whereas in the past jurors could only access the
Internet from a computer in their home or in a library, jurors can now use a smartphone during
lunch, during a break, or even inside the jury room to quickly and easily access a nearly unlimited
amount of information.82
Jurors typically do not defy court rules and conduct research on the Internet with nefarious
intent. Rather, jurors often feel pressure to perform their civic duties and make the “right” decision,
especially in cases where millions of dollars, or a person’s guilt or innocence, are on the line.83
Jurors may also access the Internet for research because they are confused by the meaning of
technical or legal terms that were not clearly explained to them by attorneys or the judge.84 In any
event, it is axiomatic that “extra-record influences pose a substantial threat to the fairness of [a]
proceeding because the extraneous information completely evades the safeguards of the judicial
process.”85
Judges have acknowledged that there is no such thing as a perfect trial.86 Rather, judges
can do no more than manage the trial, including minimizing outside influences, to the best of their
abilities. Judges are equipped with numerous procedural devices and safeguards to deter and
minimize improper exposure of jurors to the Internet. For example, judges can hold jurors in
contempt, take away their electronic devices, dismiss and replace them with alternates, or sequester
them.87 Surveys, however, have shown that the best way to ensure a jury’s impartiality is through
carefully crafted jury instructions.88

80

Id. at 641–44.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (citation omitted).
82
See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
409, 422–23 (2012).
83
Id. at 419–20.
84
Id. at 421.
85
United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1993).
86
See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553.
87
Hoffmeister, supra note 82, at 437–41.
88
Hon. Amy J. St. Eve, Hon. Charles P. Burns & Michael A. Zuckerman, More from the #Jury Box: The Latest on
Juries and Social Media, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 64, 86 (2014).
81
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a. Model Jury Instructions
In 2009, the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management released model jury instructions specifically targeted toward deterring the use of
social media during trial.89 The Model Instructions stated:
Before Trial:
You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented
here within the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you
must not conduct any independent research about this case, the matters in the case,
and the individuals or corporations involved in the case. In other words, you should
not consult dictionaries or reference materials, search the internet, websites, blogs,
or use any other electronic tools to obtain information about this case or to help you
decide the case. Please do not try to find out information from any source outside
the confines of this courtroom. Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss
this case with anyone, even your fellow jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you
may begin discussing the case with your fellow jurors, but you cannot discuss the
case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the case is at an end. I
hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy. I know that many of
you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet and other tools of technology. You
also must not talk to anyone about this case or use these tools to communicate
electronically with anyone about the case. This includes your family and friends.
You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through
e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any blog or
website, through any internet chat room, or by way of any other social networking
websites, including Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, and YouTube.
At the Close of the Case:
During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any
information to anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any
electronic device or media, such as a telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone,
Blackberry or computer; the internet, any internet service, or any text or instant
messaging service; or any internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook,
My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any
information about this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept
your verdict.90
Through its chair Judge Julie A. Robinson, the Committee distributed the model jury instructions
to all federal district court judges, stating that “more explicit mention in jury instructions of the
various methods and modes of electronic communication and research would help jurors better
understand and adhere to the scope of the prohibition against the use of [devices such as cellular

89

Model Jury Instruction Recommended to Deter Juror Use of Electronic Communication Technologies During Trial,
FED. EVID. REV. (Feb. 9, 2010), perma.cc/WNM8-8XEN.
90
Id. (emphasis added).
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telephones or computers to conduct research on the Internet or communicate with others about
cases].”91
In June 2012, the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management released revised model jury instructions, which added more detailed explanations
of the consequences of social media or Internet use during a trial, along with instructions to
jurors to report other jurors’ violations of the instructions.92
Most courts with pattern jury instructions have incorporated warnings regarding Internet
usage in some form. For example, the Fifth Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases
recommends that the following instruction regarding Internet research be conveyed to jurors at
the beginning of the trial:
[D]o not do any research—on the Internet, in libraries, in books, newspapers,
magazines, or using any other source or method. Do not make any investigation
about this case on your own. Do not visit or view any place discussed in this case
and do not use Internet programs or other devices to search for or view any place
discussed in the testimony. Do not in any way research any information about this
case, the law, or the people involved, including the parties, the witnesses, the
lawyers, or the judge, until after you have been excused as jurors. If you happen to
see or hear anything touching on this case in the media, turn away and report it to
me as soon as possible.
These rules protect the parties’ right to have this case decided only on evidence
they know about, that has been presented here in court. If you do any research,
investigation or experiment that we do not know about, or gain any information
through improper communications, then your verdict may be influenced by
inaccurate, incomplete or misleading information that has not been tested by the
trial process, which includes the oath to tell the truth and cross-examination. It
could also be unfair to the parties’ right to know what information the jurors are
relying on to decide the case. Each of the parties is entitled to a fair trial by an
impartial jury, and you must conduct yourself so as to maintain the integrity of the
trial process. If you decide the case based on information not presented in court,
you will have denied the parties a fair trial in accordance with the rules of this
country and you will have done an injustice. It is very important that you abide by
these rules. Failure to follow these instructions could result in the case having to be
retried.93
The Fifth Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instructions recommend a similar instruction to be given after the
jurors are sworn in.94

91

Memorandum from Judge Julie A. Robinson, Chair of the Judicial Conference Comm. on Court Admin. and Case
Mgmt. to the Judges of the United States District Courts (Jan. 28, 2010), perma.cc/YV48-79ZG.
92
U.S. Courts, Revised Jury Instructions Hope to Deter Juror Use of Social Media During Trial (2012), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2012/08/21/revised-jury-instructions-hope-deter-juror-use-social-media-during-trial
[perma.cc/F9Y3-A4Z9] (Aug. 21, 2012) (last visited April 21, 2019).
93
Fifth
Circuit
Pattern
Jury
Instructions
(Civil
Cases)
(2014),
http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/fifth/2014civil.pdf [perma.cc/F2Q2-V32X].
94
Id. at 4–5.
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Despite the efforts of the Judicial Conference Committee, a report released by the Federal
Judicial Center in 2014 surveying nearly 500 federal district court judges revealed that jurors
who used social media during trial or deliberations increased from 5.9% in 2011 to 6.7% in
2013.95 Although the most common forms of social media accessed by jurors included Facebook,
Twitter, and Internet chat rooms, several judges in the survey reported awareness of jurors
performing case-related research on the Internet.96
Attorneys can also assist in the prevention of unauthorized juror research, such as by
requesting specific instructions to the jury about Internet usage where standard instructions do
not exist. Attorneys (or their delegates) can also monitor each juror’s social media presence
throughout the course of a trial, paying special attention to public postings or comments made by
a juror indicating juror misconduct. Attorney ethics rules, however, prevent attorneys from
engaging in ex parte communications with a juror or prospective juror during a trial unless
authorized to do so by law or court order.97 As such, attorneys engaging in social media
monitoring should be careful not to interact directly with any jurors, such as by sending a
Facebook friend request or following a juror on Twitter.98
b. Recourse for Juror Misconduct
Parties may seek recourse for juror misconduct by making an objection, moving for a
mistrial, and/or moving for a new trial.99 Whether the court will agree to such measures depends
on whether a party has been, or will potentially be, prejudiced by the misconduct.
MEGHAN DUNN, Jurors’ and Attorneys’ Use of Social Media During Voir Dire, Trials, and Deliberations: A Report
to the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, FED. JUD. CTR. (May 1, 2014),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Jurors-Attorneys-Social-Media-Trial-Dunn-FJC-2014.pdf
[perma.cc/5FNU-WW7R].
96
Id. at 5, 6, 11.
97
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (2014).
98
Jason H. Casell, To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Juror Use of Electronic Communications and Social Networking Tools,
15(5) J. INTERNET L. 1 (2011).
99
Declaration of a mistrial or a new trial is generally an undesired result for all parties involved. “Like some ghoul in
a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried,” the mistrial or new trial stalks our judicial system once again, frightening the parties, lawyers, and sometime
judges (and their clerks). See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring). But see Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting, concurred by
Holmes, J.) (“In the search for truth through the slow process of inclusion and exclusion, involving trial and error, it
behooves us to reject, as guides, the decisions upon such questions which prove to have been mistaken.”); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 37 (1881) (“[T]ruth [is] often suggested by error.”); JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 79 (1859) (“If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced
by its collision with error.”). So it is better to do the trial right the first time. See also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Cardozo, J.) (“[I]n most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). But see Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,
391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and
thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.”); HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, ante at 5 (“[T]hen the
rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives
a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.”). As a side note,
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. were ahead of their time, building
their “reputation on writing dissents that later became the majority opinions.” For instance, Di Santo (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting, concurred by Holmes, J.) was later overruled by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116 (1941); Burnet,
285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Cardozo, J.) by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S.
376, 387 (1938); and Hyde (Holmes, J., dissenting) by Pena–Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 864 (2017).
95
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For example, in Bell v. Uribe, finding lack of prejudice, the Ninth Circuit reversed a
district court’s grant of a habeas petition.100 In the original trial, the trial judge had dismissed a
juror (Juror No. 7) during jury deliberations, after another juror informed the court that Juror No.
7 worked in the mental health field and concluded that the defendants were suicidal and suffered
from clinical depression. As such, Juror No. 7 became the lone holdout juror preventing the jury
from reaching a unanimous verdict. Although the other jurors informed the judge that they
prevented Juror No. 7 from offering her mental health opinion during the deliberation process,
they also reported that Juror No. 7 had conducted research at home into the clinical definition of
“depression” and brought in materials to show other jurors.101 The trial court had instructed the
jury to “not do any independent research, either on the internet or looking at legal books . . . or
looking at a dictionary.”102 The Ninth Circuit found that the trial court’s dismissal of Juror No. 7
was not improper, noting that “[e]ven assuming [Juror No. 7’s] misconduct had not been
prejudicial yet, the trial court could reasonably find that, if she remained on the jury, she was
likely to indulge in further misconduct.”103
Objections must be made timely, at the time of a party’s discovery of the misconduct.104
A party may not “take his chances on a favorable verdict and if unfavorable[,] get a second bite
[at] the apple.”105
i.

Mistrials

During trial, in addition to making an objection, the aggrieved party can also move for a
mistrial. A court’s authority to declare mistrials is based on common law. “[T]rial judges may
declare a mistrial whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration,
there is a manifest necessity for doing so. The decision to declare a mistrial is left to the sound
discretion of the judge, but the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent
circumstances, and for very plain and obvious cases.”106 The trial court has broad discretion in
considering whether to grant a mistrial due to extrinsic or intrinsic influences on the jury, and the
ultimate inquiry is: “Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and thereby its verdict?”107
A mistrial is warranted only if the extra-record information prejudiced the jury’s impartiality.108
After deliberations have begun, however, many courts apply an objective test to decide
whether a mistrial is warranted, focusing on (1) the nature of the information or contact at issue,
and (2) its probable effect on a hypothetical average jury.109 This is because the Federal Rules of
Evidence, while allowing a juror to testify about whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury’s attention, prevents a court from eliciting testimony from a juror
about the effect such information has upon the jurors during deliberations.110
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For example, in one case a district court discovered that one juror had conducted Internet
research to find out that the defendant in the trial was the only defendant left in the case, and that
all other defendants had settled for a million dollars each.111 Instead of inquiring as to whether
such knowledge affected that juror’s actual deliberations, the court reasoned that evidence at the
trial indicating that there were other responsible companies and the court’s instruction to the jury
to apportion liability among the companies would have led a juror to “easily make the
connection that these other defendants had settled without being informed that this was the case
by another juror who claimed to have obtained the information from the Internet.”112 As such,
the court concluded that the knowledge “would be highly unlikely to have prejudiced the average
juror’s deliberative process,” and rejected the defendant’s argument that the court had erred by
not granting a mistrial.113
ii.

Motion for a New Trial

If juror misconduct is not discovered until after the verdict, then the aggrieved party may
move for a new trial.114 A party may also move for a new trial if the misconduct surfaced during
trial, but the district court may refuse to order a mistrial.115
In a civil case, exposure of jurors to information outside of the record requires a showing
that the information is prejudicial to the unsuccessful party.116 Because a verdict has already
been reached, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) limits the court’s ability to inquire about the
effect of such information upon the jury’s deliberations.117 Instead, the district court must
analyze whether there is a “reasonable possibility” that the information altered the jury’s
verdict.118
III.

INTERNET RESEARCH BY LAWYERS

While lawyers are not as tightly bound as judges and jurors, they should abide by at least
two relevant rules: the competence requirement under Model Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (hereinafter, “Model Rule 1.1”) and the certification requirements for
representations to the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) (hereinafter, “FRCP
11(b)”).119 A form of Model Rule 1.1 has been adopted in forty-nine states.120
111
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FRCP 11(b) requires an attorney to conduct an “inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances” before submitting any pleading, motion, or paper to the courts.121 Model Rule 1.1
requires attorneys to provide competent representation, meaning the attorney must engage in
“thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”122 The comments to
Model Rule 1.1 further state, “To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing
legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.” 123 Thus, to maintain his duty of
competence, a lawyer should make reasonable efforts to stay abreast of changes in technology.
Under the guidance of these two rules, attorneys need to be thorough and prepared in their
representations. The following sections discuss implications on frequently encountered issues
pertaining to legal and factual research.
a. Use of Free Internet Research Resources
It goes without saying that clients paying for the services of an attorney will expect their
attorneys to have thoroughly reviewed the relevant case law. Most lawyers would agree that using
solely hard copy texts would be inadequate to research complex legal issues, especially when few
lawyers have access to sufficiently large libraries for such purpose.124 On the other hand, there are
an increasing number of free online resources that are quite comprehensive in their coverage. For
example, Google Scholar provides access to state supreme and appellate court cases since 1950;
federal district, appellate, tax and bankruptcy court decisions since 1923; and U.S. Supreme Court
cases since 1791.125 Similar services such as Open Jurist and Find a Case offer free access to
millions of published case opinions.
Lawyers may wonder if it is necessary for them to always use paid services such as
Westlaw, LexisNexis, or Bloomberg Law to conduct case law research when the same cases are
likely available for free elsewhere. A cautious attorney would answer in the affirmative, under
most circumstances. If a lawyer conveys a case to her client or to cite it to the court, then she is
representing that the case is good law, and the lawyer should have first made sure that it was still
good law. Despite the advent of new and diverse legal research databases, most attorneys still turn
to long-standing cite-checking tools like Shepard’s or KeyCite in determining whether a case is
valid and citable.126
The authors of this paper were unable to find a published federal or state court decision
where a party or attorney was sanctioned for failing to cite-check a cited case. In one case,
however, a court somewhat empathized with the plaintiffs, a group of homeless individuals, and
their attorney regarding the high expense of using a research platform with cite-checking
capabilities, but nonetheless mildly chastised the plaintiffs’ attorney for relying upon an overturned
case.127 The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, stating:
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This is the primary reason why the Court questions Mr. Flores–Williams’s financial
resources. If he had been using a service such as Westlaw or LexisNexis, it would
have been nearly impossible for him to miss the red flag or stop sign icons. These
services are expensive, however, prompting the Court to wonder whether Mr.
Flores–Williams has avoided paying that money and has instead relied on free
online resources. The Court cannot fault such thrift, if that is indeed the motive, but
it does raise questions generally about his ability to sustain a class-action lawsuit.128
However, just because a party or attorney is unlikely to face sanctions does not mean that the
attorney has complied with his duty to his client. Attorneys should make sure they conduct research
in a thorough manner, within reason given the applicable circumstances.
Aside from lacking robust cite-checking capabilities, free online resources may not be as
accurate as paid services. For example, Google Scholar itself states that “[l]egal opinions in Google
Scholar are provided for informational purposes only and should not be relied on as a substitute
for legal advice from a licensed lawyer. Google does not warrant that the information is complete
or accurate.”129 In addition, updates to existing records on Google Scholar may take longer than a
year. 130 Moreover, Google Scholar often publishes multiple versions of a single opinion. For
example, a Google Scholar case law search for “In re Cray, Inc.” yields two versions—one
containing the Federal Reporter citation (871 F.3d 1355 (2017)), and an earlier version of the
opinion where a Federal Reporter citation had not yet been assigned.131 If a lawyer fails to check
carefully, she may accidentally cite an older version of an opinion when a newer one is available.
That is not to say the use of free legal resources is never acceptable. A lawyer who is simply
retrieving a single case or doing background reading on an area of law may find free resources to
be more convenient. However, until free resources are able to instill a level of confidence such that
the information they provide is accurate and up-to-date, lawyers will generally need to consult paid
resources to ensure they are meeting their duties to their clients and the courts.
b. Rotten Links
An administrative issue frequently encountered by both lawyers and courts is rotten
Internet links. The phenomenon known as “link rot” describes when an Internet hyperlink points
to a webpage that has been taken down. “Reference rot” occurs when the linked webpage exists,
but the information originally referenced is no longer present.132 Link rot and reference rot are
widespread, to the point where judges have questioned whether the abundance of nonworking links
risks “destroying stare decisis.”133
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This problem is not new. As early as 1995, researchers documenting the impact of fleeting
web content found dead links in one-third of scholarly e-journal articles from 1993 to 1995.134 A
similar study found 29% of the websites cited by the U.S. Supreme Court from 1996 to 2010
nonfunctioning, many of which linked to government or education domains. 135 Another study
found that 70% of the links in three different Harvard law journals from 1999 to 2012 were dead.136
Rotten links in a court opinion detract from the substance of the opinion. “Citations provide
both authorial verification of the original source material at the moment they are used and the
needed information for readers to later find the cited source.”137 For attorneys, citing to a broken
link in a complaint or brief may be an embarrassing gaffe at best, and can substantively affect the
outcome of the decision at worst. For example, in Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons failed to obtain dismissal of a prison inmate’s allegations of due process and
free speech violations after the Bureau cited in its brief several links to websites no longer in
existence; the Bureau had attempted to rely on these websites to allege that an organization with
which the inmate had communicated was linked to international terrorism.138
Fortunately, the problem of rotten links is being actively addressed by services such as
Perma.cc from the Harvard Library Innovation Lab, which creates archived records of webpages
and a permanent web link to those records. 139 The difference between the Internet Archive
(archive.org) and Perma.cc is that archive.org automatically, but “only occasionally[,] trawls and
stores any given corner of the Internet, meaning there is no guarantee that a given page would be
archived to reflect what an author or editor saw at the moment of citation,” whereas Perma.cc
requires authors and editors to generate a Perma.cc link from the original website, which they can
then use as a citation (instead of the original website’s link).140
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One drawback of using Perma.cc instead of a conventional hyperlink is that the Perma.cc
link cannot immediately convey to the reader where the linked content originates. Nonetheless,
with the proliferation of Perma.cc and other permanent web-linking services like it, attorneys may
eventually simply link to a permanent web-linking service instead of printing and attaching
webpages as exhibits to a brief. This, of course, assumes that the web-linking service itself is not
susceptible to link rot.
c. Factual Evidence from the Internet – Evidentiary Issues
For many, reliance on information from the Internet has become so commonplace that it
can be easy to forget that its admission in court still requires that basic evidentiary requirements
be met, such as compliance with Federal Rules of Evidence 802 and 901.141 Non-governmental
websites must be authenticated by the party offering the evidence in order to be admissible.142 A
webpage will be inadmissible if the proffering party cannot provide a sufficient basis for a court
to conclude that the webpage is what the party claims it to be.143 If admitted, however, webpages
of the opposing party are usually excluded from the hearsay rule as admissions by a partyopponent.144
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the age of fake news and alternative facts, 145 one should be especially wary when
conducting searches on the Internet. As to those in law whose decisions have legal consequences,
judges, jurors, and lawyers face different issues and considerations in their uses of the Internet to
conduct research. As jurors must avoid conducting any type of independent research during a trial,
on the Internet or otherwise, lawyers should be aware of the procedural devices available to them
if their client has been prejudiced by a juror conducting such research (e.g., by filing a motion for
a mistrial or for a new trial). Lawyers are generally free to use the Internet to conduct legal and
factual research. In doing so, however, lawyers should be careful to make sure any information
cited to a court or conveyed to a client is accurate and reliable. Finally, judges are free to conduct
legal research on the Internet outside of a pending case, but in the adjudication of facts, they should
adhere to the facts in the record or those that are judicially noticed in deciding cases.

for $20/month that allows one user to create unlimited links, and (3) institutional account for $100/month that allows
users to: (i) create unlimited links, (ii) access a foldering and collaboration interface that would allow team members
to work on projects together and see what links having already been made, if desired, and (iii) create private folders
that would not be visible to everyone.
141
See FED. R. EVID. 802, 901.
142
Associated Indem. Corp. v. Small, No. 06-cv-187, 2008 WL 11338112, at *12 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2008) (collecting
cases).
143
See United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2014) (district court erred by assuming information on
defendant’s Facebook page was provided by him); United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (web
postings lacked authentication, as “Jackson needed to show that the web postings in which the white supremacist
groups took responsibility for the racist mailings actually were posted by the groups, as opposed to being slipped onto
the groups’ web sites by Jackson herself, who was a skilled computer user”).
144
See TIP Sys., LLC v. SBC Operations, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 745, 756 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
145
See Zahr K. Said & Jessica Silbey, Narrative Topoi in the Digital Age, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 110 (2018); Lee K.
Royster, Fake News: Potential Solutions to the Online Epidemic, 96 N.C. L. REV. 270, 276–80 (2017); Toronto, supra
note 1, at 169–72.

